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  <updated>2026-10-03T06:14:36.770770+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-41654</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-41654 — Weblate is Vulnerable to Authenticated SSRF via Project Backup Import bypassing validate_repo_url</title>
    <updated>2026-10-03T06:14:36.802864+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> WeblateOrg weblate</p>
<p>Weblate is a web based localization tool. Prior to version 5.17.1, an authenticated user with project.add permission (default on hosted Weblate SaaS and for any user holding an active billing/trial plan) can import a crafted project backup ZIP whose components/&lt;name&gt;.json contains an attacker-chosen repo URL pointing at a private address (e.g. http://127.0.0.1:9999/) or using a non-allow-listed scheme (e.g. file://, git://). Weblate persists the component via Component.objects.bulk_create([component])[0], which bypasses Django's full_clean() and therefore never runs the validate_repo_url validator. The URL is subsequently written verbatim into .git/config by configure_repo(pull=False). This issue has been patched in version 5.17.1.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-41654"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-cwcx-382v-8m9g</id>
    <title>GHSA-cwcx-382v-8m9g — Weblate Vulnerable to Authenticated SSRF via Project Backup Import bypassing validate_repo_url</title>
    <updated>2026-10-03T06:14:36.802936+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: weblate</p>
<p>### Impact
An authenticated user with `project.add` permission (default on hosted Weblate SaaS and for any user holding an active billing/trial plan) can import a crafted project backup ZIP whose `components/&lt;name&gt;.json` contains an attacker-chosen `repo` URL pointing at a **private address** (e.g. `http://127.0.0.1:9999/`) or using a **non-allow-listed scheme** (e.g. `file://`, `git://`). Weblate persists the component via `Component.objects.bulk_create([component])[0]`, which bypasses Django's `full_clean()` and therefore never runs the `validate_repo_url` validator. The URL is subsequently written verbatim into `.git/config` by `configure_repo(pull=False)`.</p>
<p>### Patches
* https://github.com/WeblateOrg/weblate/pull/19061
* https://github.com/WeblateOrg/weblate/pull/19062</p>
<p>### Workarounds
Limiting who can create projects limits the scope.</p>
<p>### Resources
Weblate thanks @fg0x0 for reporting this vulnerability via GitHub.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-cwcx-382v-8m9g"/>
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