Affected: Homebrew: dynaconf

### Summary Dynaconf is vulnerable to Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) due to unsafe template evaluation in the @jinja resolver. When the jinja2 package is installed, Dynaconf evaluates template expressions embedded in configuration values without a sandboxed environment.

If an attacker can influence configuration sources such as: environment variables .env files container environment configuration CI/CD secrets they can execute arbitrary OS commands on the host system. In addition, the @format resolver allows object graph traversal, which may expose sensitive runtime objects and environment variables.

### Details The vulnerability arises because Dynaconf's string resolvers lack proper security boundaries.

1. @jinja Resolver The @jinja resolver renders templates using full Jinja2 evaluation. However, the rendering context is not sandboxed, which allows attackers to access Python's internal attributes. Using objects such as cycler, attackers can reach Python's __globals__ and import the os module.

Example attack path cycler → __init__ → __globals__ → os → popen() This leads to arbitrary command execution.

2. @format Resolver The @format resolver performs Python string formatting using internal objects. This allows attackers to traverse Python's object graph and access sensitive runtime objects. Example traversal: {this.__class__.__init__.__globals__[os].environ} This can expose - API keys - database credentials - internal service tokens - environment secrets

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Affected: dynaconf

dynaconf is a configuration management tool for Python. Prior to version 3.2.13, Dynaconf is vulnerable to Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) due to unsafe template evaluation in the @Jinja resolver. When the jinja2 package is installed, Dynaconf evaluates template expressions embedded in configuration values without a sandboxed environment. This issue has been patched in version 3.2.13.

Affected: PyPI: dynaconf

### Summary Dynaconf is vulnerable to Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) due to unsafe template evaluation in the @jinja resolver. When the jinja2 package is installed, Dynaconf evaluates template expressions embedded in configuration values without a sandboxed environment.

If an attacker can influence configuration sources such as: environment variables .env files container environment configuration CI/CD secrets they can execute arbitrary OS commands on the host system. In addition, the @format resolver allows object graph traversal, which may expose sensitive runtime objects and environment variables.

### Details The vulnerability arises because Dynaconf's string resolvers lack proper security boundaries.

1. @jinja Resolver The @jinja resolver renders templates using full Jinja2 evaluation. However, the rendering context is not sandboxed, which allows attackers to access Python's internal attributes. Using objects such as cycler, attackers can reach Python's __globals__ and import the os module.

Example attack path cycler → __init__ → __globals__ → os → popen() This leads to arbitrary command execution.

2. @format Resolver The @format resolver performs Python string formatting using internal objects. This allows attackers to traverse Python's object graph and access sensitive runtime objects. Example traversal: {this.__class__.__init__.__globals__[os].environ} This can expose - API keys - database credentials - internal service tokens - environment secrets

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