https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10 Most recent entries from all 2026-10-03T07:32:56.415646+00:00 Vulnerability-Lookup csirt@opendfir.org python-feedgen Contains only the most 10 recent entries. https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-57573 CVE-2026-57573 — Crawl4AI unauthenticated SSRF in Docker streaming crawl endpoint 2026-10-03T07:32:56.453570+00:00

Affected: unclecode crawl4ai

Crawl4AI is an open-source LLM-friendly web crawler and scraper. Prior to 0.9.0, the Docker API server applied its SSRF destination check on the non-streaming /crawl path but not on the streaming path. handle_stream_crawl_request passed seed URLs straight to the crawler with no destination validation, allowing a remote unauthenticated client to call POST /crawl/stream or POST /crawl with crawler_config.stream=true with a URL pointing at an internal, private, or link-local address; the server fetched it and streamed the response body back. This issue is fixed in version 0.9.0.

 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-wm69-2pc3-rmmf GHSA-wm69-2pc3-rmmf — Crawl4AI: Unauthenticated SSRF on the Docker server streaming crawl path (/crawl/stream) 2026-10-03T07:32:56.453652+00:00

Affected: PyPI: crawl4ai

### Summary

The Docker API server applied its SSRF destination check (`validate_url_destination`) on the non-streaming `/crawl` path but not on the streaming path. `handle_stream_crawl_request` passed seed URLs straight to the crawler with no destination validation. A remote, unauthenticated client could call `POST /crawl/stream` (or `POST /crawl` with `crawler_config.stream=true`, which short-circuits to the same handler) with a URL pointing at an internal, private, or link-local address; the server fetched it and streamed the response body back. The Docker API is unauthenticated by default.

### Affected paths

`POST /crawl/stream`, and `POST /crawl` with `crawler_config.stream=true` (both route to `handle_stream_crawl_request`, `deploy/docker/api.py`).

### Impact

Unauthenticated read server-side request forgery: an attacker reads internal-only services and cloud-metadata endpoints (e.g. `http://169.254.169.254/` for IAM credentials), with the response body streamed back. This is the same class and severity as the project's prior "SSRF via Direct Crawl Endpoints" advisory; `/crawl/stream` is part of that endpoint family and was never covered by the destination check.

### Fix

`handle_stream_crawl_request` now validates every seed URL's destination with the same global-routability check as `handle_crawl_request`, before any fetch. The SSRF regression test was hardened to assert per-handler coverage (including the streaming handler) rather than a bare occurrence count, w…