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  <updated>2026-10-03T11:29:08.622668+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2025-66448</id>
    <title>CVE-2025-66448 — vLLM vulnerable to remote code execution via transformers_utils/get_config</title>
    <updated>2026-10-03T11:29:08.655513+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> vllm-project vllm</p>
<p>vLLM is an inference and serving engine for large language models (LLMs). Prior to 0.11.1, vllm has a critical remote code execution vector in a config class named Nemotron_Nano_VL_Config. When vllm loads a model config that contains an auto_map entry, the config class resolves that mapping with get_class_from_dynamic_module(...) and immediately instantiates the returned class. This fetches and executes Python from the remote repository referenced in the auto_map string. Crucially, this happens even when the caller explicitly sets trust_remote_code=False in vllm.transformers_utils.config.get_config. In practice, an attacker can publish a benign-looking frontend repo whose config.json points via auto_map to a separate malicious backend repo; loading the frontend will silently run the backend’s code on the victim host. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.11.1.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2025-66448"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-8fr4-5q9j-m8gm</id>
    <title>GHSA-8fr4-5q9j-m8gm — vLLM vulnerable to remote code execution via transformers_utils/get_config</title>
    <updated>2026-10-03T11:29:08.655583+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: vllm</p>
<p>### Summary</p>
<p>`vllm` has a critical remote code execution vector in a config class named `Nemotron_Nano_VL_Config`. When `vllm` loads a model config that contains an `auto_map` entry, the config class resolves that mapping with `get_class_from_dynamic_module(...)` and immediately instantiates the returned class. This fetches and executes Python from the remote repository referenced in the `auto_map` string. Crucially, this happens even when the caller explicitly sets `trust_remote_code=False` in `vllm.transformers_utils.config.get_config`. In practice, an attacker can publish a benign-looking frontend repo whose `config.json` points via `auto_map` to a separate malicious backend repo; loading the frontend will silently run the backend’s code on the victim host.</p>
<p>### Details</p>
<p>The vulnerable code resolves and instantiates classes from `auto_map` entries without checking whether those entries point to a different repo or whether remote code execution is allowed.</p>
<p>```python
class Nemotron_Nano_VL_Config(PretrainedConfig):
    model_type = 'Llama_Nemotron_Nano_VL'</p>
<p>def __init__(self, **kwargs):
        super().__init__(**kwargs)</p>
<p>if vision_config is not None:
            assert "auto_map" in vision_config and "AutoConfig" in vision_config["auto_map"]
            # &lt;-- vulnerable dynamic resolution + instantiation happens here
            vision_auto_config = get_class_from_dynamic_module(*vision_config["auto_map"]["AutoConfig"].split("--")[::-1])
            self.visio…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-8fr4-5q9j-m8gm"/>
  </entry>
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