https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10 Most recent entries from all 2026-10-02T12:23:02.695664+00:00 Vulnerability-Lookup csirt@opendfir.org python-feedgen Contains only the most 10 recent entries. https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-sigstore-cve-2026-24408 BREW-sigstore-CVE-2026-24408 — sigstore has CSRF possibility in OIDC authentication during signing 2026-10-02T12:23:02.697711+00:00

Affected: Homebrew: sigstore

sigstore-python is a Python tool for generating and verifying Sigstore signatures. Prior to version 4.2.0, the sigstore-python OAuth authentication flow is susceptible to Cross-Site Request Forgery. `_OAuthSession` creates a unique "state" and sends it as a parameter in the authentication request but the "state" in the server response seems not not be cross-checked with this value. Version 4.2.0 contains a patch for the issue.

 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-24408 CVE-2026-24408 — sigstore has CSRF possibility in OIDC authentication during signing 2026-10-02T12:23:02.697761+00:00

Affected: sigstore-python

sigstore-python is a Python tool for generating and verifying Sigstore signatures. Prior to version 4.2.0, the sigstore-python OAuth authentication flow is susceptible to Cross-Site Request Forgery. `_OAuthSession` creates a unique "state" and sends it as a parameter in the authentication request but the "state" in the server response seems not not be cross-checked with this value. Version 4.2.0 contains a patch for the issue.

 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-hm8f-75xx-w2vr GHSA-hm8f-75xx-w2vr — sigstore CSRF possibility in OIDC authentication during signing 2026-10-02T12:23:02.697792+00:00

Affected: PyPI: sigstore

### Summary

The sigstore-python OAuth authentication flow is susceptible to Cross-Site Request Forgery.

### Details

`_OAuthSession` creates a unique "state" and sends it as a parameter in the authentication request but the "state" in the server response seems not not be cross-checked with this value.

Fix should be fairly trivial.

### Impact

This should be low impact: A man-in-the middle attacker could trick a sigstore-python user into signing something with an identity controlled by the attacker (by returning the response to an authentication request they created). This would be quite confusing but not dangerous.