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  <updated>2026-10-12T23:06:12.505119+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2025-48071</id>
    <title>CVE-2025-48071 — OpenEXR's Forged Unpacked Size can Lead to Heap-Based Buffer Overflow in Deep Scanline Parsing</title>
    <updated>2026-10-12T23:06:12.507831+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> AcademySoftwareFoundation openexr</p>
<p>OpenEXR provides the specification and reference implementation of the EXR file format, an image storage format for the motion picture industry. In versions 3.3.2 through 3.3.0, there is a heap-based buffer overflow during a write operation when decompressing ZIPS-packed deep scan-line EXR files with a maliciously forged chunk header. This is fixed in version 3.3.3.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2025-48071"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-h45x-qhg2-q375</id>
    <title>GHSA-h45x-qhg2-q375 — OpenEXR Heap-Based Buffer Overflow in Deep Scanline Parsing via Forged Unpacked Size</title>
    <updated>2026-10-12T23:06:12.507897+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: OpenEXR</p>
<p>### Summary</p>
<p>The OpenEXRCore code is vulnerable to a heap-based buffer overflow during a write operation when decompressing ZIPS-packed deep scan-line EXR files with a maliciously forged chunk header.</p>
<p>### Details
When parsing `STORAGE_DEEP_SCANLINE` chunks from an EXR file, the following code (from `src/lib/OpenEXRCore/chunk.c`) is used to extract the chunk information:</p>
<p>```cpp</p>
<p>if (part-&gt;storage_mode == EXR_STORAGE_DEEP_SCANLINE)
// SNIP...
        cinfo-&gt;sample_count_data_offset = dataoff;
        cinfo-&gt;sample_count_table_size  = (uint64_t) ddata[0];
        cinfo-&gt;data_offset              = dataoff + (uint64_t) ddata[0];
        cinfo-&gt;packed_size              = (uint64_t) ddata[1];
        cinfo-&gt;unpacked_size            = (uint64_t) ddata[2];
// SNIP...
```</p>
<p>By storing this information, the code that will later decompress and reconstruct the chunk bytes, will know how much space the uncompressed data will occupy.</p>
<p>This size is carried along in the chain of decoding/decompression until the `undo_zip_impl` function in `src/lib/OpenEXRCore/internal_zip.c`:</p>
<p>```cpp
static exr_result_t
undo_zip_impl (
    exr_decode_pipeline_t* decode,
    const void*            compressed_data,
    uint64_t               comp_buf_size,
    void*                  uncompressed_data,
    uint64_t               uncompressed_size,
    void*                  scratch_data,
    uint64_t               scratch_size)
{
    size_t       actual_out_bytes;
    exr_result_t res;</p>
<p>if (scratch_size &lt;…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-h45x-qhg2-q375"/>
  </entry>
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