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  <updated>2026-10-03T08:37:14.857192+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-22606</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-22606 — Fickling has a bypass via runpy.run_path() and runpy.run_module()</title>
    <updated>2026-10-03T08:37:14.888851+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> trailofbits fickling</p>
<p>Fickling is a Python pickling decompiler and static analyzer. Fickling versions up to and including 0.1.6 do not treat Python’s runpy module as unsafe. Because of this, a malicious pickle that uses runpy.run_path() or runpy.run_module() is classified as SUSPICIOUS instead of OVERTLY_MALICIOUS. If a user relies on Fickling’s output to decide whether a pickle is safe to deserialize, this misclassification can lead them to execute attacker-controlled code on their system. This affects any workflow or product that uses Fickling as a security gate for pickle deserialization. This issue has been patched in version 0.1.7.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-22606"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-wfq2-52f7-7qvj</id>
    <title>GHSA-wfq2-52f7-7qvj — Fickling has a bypass via runpy.run_path() and runpy.run_module()</title>
    <updated>2026-10-03T08:37:14.888919+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: fickling</p>
<p># Fickling's assessment</p>
<p>`runpy`  was added to the list of unsafe imports (https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/9a2b3f89bd0598b528d62c10a64c1986fcb09f66).</p>
<p># Original report</p>
<p>### Summary
Fickling versions up to and including 0.1.6 do not treat Python’s runpy module as unsafe. Because of this, a malicious pickle that uses runpy.run_path() or runpy.run_module() is classified as SUSPICIOUS instead of OVERTLY_MALICIOUS.</p>
<p>If a user relies on Fickling’s output to decide whether a pickle is safe to deserialize, this misclassification can lead them to execute attacker-controlled code on their system.</p>
<p>This affects any workflow or product that uses Fickling as a security gate for pickle deserialization.</p>
<p>### Details
The `runpy` module is missing from fickling's block list of unsafe module imports in `fickling/analysis.py`. This is the same root cause as CVE-2025-67748 (pty) and CVE-2025-67747 (marshal/types).</p>
<p>Incriminated source code:
- File: `fickling/analysis.py`
- Class: `UnsafeImports`
- Issue: The blocklist does not include `runpy`, `runpy.run_path`, `runpy.run_module`, or `runpy._run_code`</p>
<p>Reference to similar fix:
- PR #187 added `pty` to the blocklist to fix CVE-2025-67748
- PR #108 documented the blocklist approach
- The same fix pattern should be applied for `runpy`</p>
<p>How the bypass works:
1. Attacker creates a pickle using `runpy.run_path()` in `__reduce__`
2. Fickling's `UnsafeImports` analysis does not flag `runpy` as dangerous
3. Only the `UnusedVariables` he…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-wfq2-52f7-7qvj"/>
  </entry>
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