https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10 Most recent entries from all 2026-10-03T06:37:48.882798+00:00 Vulnerability-Lookup csirt@opendfir.org python-feedgen Contains only the most 10 recent entries. https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-42313 CVE-2026-42313 — pyload-ng: non-admin SETTINGS users can redirect all outbound traffic through an attacker-controlled proxy 2026-10-03T06:37:48.884509+00:00

Affected: pyload

pyLoad is a free and open-source download manager written in Python. Prior to 0.5.0b3.dev100, the set_config_value() API method (@permission(Perms.SETTINGS)) in src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py gates security-sensitive options behind a hand-maintained allowlist ADMIN_ONLY_CORE_OPTIONS. The allowlist contains ("proxy", "username") and ("proxy", "password") — which protect the proxy credentials — but it does not include ("proxy", "enabled"), ("proxy", "host"), ("proxy", "port"), or ("proxy", "type"). Any authenticated user with the non-admin SETTINGS permission can enable proxying and point pyload at any host they control. From that point, every outbound download, captcha fetch, update check, and plugin HTTP call is transparently routed through the attacker. This is a direct continuation of the fix family CVE-2026-33509 / CVE-2026-35463 / CVE-2026-35464 / CVE-2026-35586, each of which patched a different missed option in the same allowlist. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.5.0b3.dev100.

 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-pg67-9wjv-mr85 GHSA-pg67-9wjv-mr85 — pyload-ng: non-admin SETTINGS users can redirect all outbound traffic through an attacker-controlled proxy via unrestri… 2026-10-03T06:37:48.884573+00:00

Affected: PyPI: pyload-ng

### Summary

The `set_config_value()` API method (`@permission(Perms.SETTINGS)`) in `src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py` gates security-sensitive options behind a hand-maintained allowlist `ADMIN_ONLY_CORE_OPTIONS`. The allowlist contains `("proxy", "username")` and `("proxy", "password")` — which protect the proxy credentials — but it does **not** include `("proxy", "enabled")`, `("proxy", "host")`, `("proxy", "port")`, or `("proxy", "type")`. Any authenticated user with the non-admin `SETTINGS` permission can enable proxying and point pyload at any host they control. From that point, every outbound download, captcha fetch, update check, and plugin HTTP call is transparently routed through the attacker.

Gating only the proxy credentials is ineffective: the attacker is the proxy endpoint, so they do not need pyload's proxy-auth secret. `proxy.username` / `proxy.password` were designed so an admin could authenticate to a trusted corporate proxy; they do not help when the non-admin attacker is free to choose the proxy itself.

This is a direct continuation of the fix family CVE-2026-33509 / CVE-2026-35463 / CVE-2026-35464 / CVE-2026-35586, each of which patched a different missed option in the same allowlist. CVE-2026-35586 in particular bundled three related SSL-cert options into one advisory on the same rationale applied here — the four `proxy.*` fields are jointly required to weaponize the miss and are patched together.

### Details

**Writer** — `src/pyload/core/api/__init__…