Affected: motioneye-project motioneye

motionEye is an online interface for the software motion, a video surveillance program with motion detection. In versions 0.43.1b1 through 0.43.1b3, using a constructed (camera) device path with the `add`/`add_camera` motionEye web API allows an attacker with motionEye admin user credentials to execute any command within a non-interactive shell as motionEye run user, `motion` by default. The vulnerability has been patched with motionEye v0.43.1b4. As a workaround, apply the patch manually.

Affected: PyPI: motioneye

### Summary Using a constructed (camera) device path with the `config/add`/`add_camera` motionEye web API allows an attacker with motionEye admin user credentials to execute any UNIX shell code within a non-interactive shell as executing user of the motionEye instance, `motion` by default.

#### function call stack 1. `post` 2. `add_camera` 3. `config.add_camera` 4. `v4l2ctl.list_resolutions` 5. `utils.call_subprocess` 6. `subprocess.run`

### PoC #### build ```sh RUN_USER="user" RUN_UID=$(id -u ${RUN_USER}) RUN_GID=$(id -g ${RUN_USER}) TIMESTAMP="$(date '+%Y%m%d-%H%M')"

docker build \ --network host \ --build-arg="RUN_UID=${RUN_UID?}" \ --build-arg="RUN_GID=${RUN_GID?}" \ -t "${USER?}/motioneye:${TIMESTAMP}" \ --no-cache \ -f docker/Dockerfile . ```

#### reproduce Run: ```sh docker run --rm -d -p 8765:8765 --hostname="motioneye" -v /etc/localtime:/etc/localtime:ro -v /tmp/motioneyeconfig:/etc/motioneye -v /tmp/motioneyeconfig:/var/lib/motioneye ``` ```console bash-4.2$ docker logs ceb435eacf55 -f configure_logging cmd motioneye: False configure logging to file: None INFO: hello! this is motionEye server 0.43.1b3 DEBUG: found motion executable "/usr/bin/motion" version "4.7.0" DEBUG: found ffmpeg executable "/usr/bin/ffmpeg" version "7.1.1-1+b1" DEBUG: listing config dir /etc/motioneye... DEBUG: found camera with id 1 DEBUG: reading camera config from /etc/motioneye/camera-1.conf... DEBUG: loading additional config structure for…