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  <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10</id>
  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-10-02T21:36:22.421911+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2023-51649</id>
    <title>CVE-2023-51649 — Nautobot missing object-level permissions enforcement when running Job Buttons</title>
    <updated>2026-10-02T21:36:22.423691+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> nautobot</p>
<p>Nautobot is a Network Source of Truth and Network Automation Platform built as a web application atop the Django Python framework with a PostgreSQL or MySQL database. When submitting a Job to run via a Job Button, only the model-level `extras.run_job` permission is checked (i.e., does the user have permission to run Jobs in general). Object-level permissions (i.e., does the user have permission to run this specific Job?) are not enforced by the URL/view used in this case. A user with permissions to run even a single Job can actually run all configured JobButton Jobs. Fix will be available in Nautobot 1.6.8 and 2.1.0</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2023-51649"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-vf5m-xrhm-v999</id>
    <title>GHSA-vf5m-xrhm-v999 — Nautobot missing object-level permissions enforcement when running Job Buttons</title>
    <updated>2026-10-02T21:36:22.423745+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: nautobot</p>
<p>### Impact</p>
<p>When submitting a Job to run via a Job Button, only the model-level `extras.run_job` permission is checked (i.e., does the user have permission to run Jobs in general?). Object-level permissions (i.e., does the user have permission to run this *specific* Job?) are not enforced by the URL/view used in this case (`/extras/job-button/&lt;uuid&gt;/run/`) The effect is that a user with permissions to run even a single Job can actually run all configured JobButton Jobs.</p>
<p>&gt; Not all Jobs can be configured as JobButtons; only those implemented as subclasses of `JobButtonReceiver` can be used in this way, so this vulnerability only applies specifically to `JobButtonReceiver` subclasses.</p>
<p>Additionally, although the documentation states that both `extras.run_job` permission and `extras.run_jobbutton` permission must be granted to a user in order to run Jobs via JobButton, the `extras.run_jobbutton` permission is not actually enforced by the view code, only by the UI by disabling the button from being clicked normally. Furthermore, the `extras.run_jobbutton` permission never prevented invoking Jobs (including `JobButtonReceiver` subclasses) via the normal "Job Run" UI, so after some discussion, we've decided that the `extras.run_jobbutton` permission is redundant, and as it never achieved its stated/documented purpose, the fixes below will remove the UI check for `extras.run_jobbutton` and all other references to the `extras.run_jobbutton` permission, rather than adding enforcement…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-vf5m-xrhm-v999"/>
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