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  <updated>2026-10-04T16:02:40.213834+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-45390</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-45390</title>
    <updated>2026-10-04T16:02:40.229888+00:00</updated>
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        <p>In OCaml-tar before 3.4.0, a crafted archive with ../ path segments in its name allows escaping the current working directory. This is not desired behavior, and tar(1) rejects such extractions, but ocaml-tar decompresses it anyway. The impact is that it allows arbitrary file writes outside of the desired extraction directory (to an attacker that can reach a tar decompression endpoint).</p>
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