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  <updated>2026-10-07T09:16:41.619975+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-81003</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-81003 — net/iucv: filter frames in afiucv_hs_rcv() by ingress device</title>
    <updated>2026-10-07T09:16:41.636635+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Linux</p>
<p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p>
<p>net/iucv: filter frames in afiucv_hs_rcv() by ingress device</p>
<p>afiucv_hs_rcv() selects a socket from iucv_sk_list by matching four 8-byte
name fields in the transport header alone. No check is made against the
net_device the frame arrived on.</p>
<p>This can cause a frame arriving on any netdev to be delivered to an AF_IUCV
socket. Three problems follow.</p>
<p>First, a frame arriving over HiperSockets can be delivered to a socket
bound to the classic z/VM IUCV transport, which has iucv-&gt;hs_dev == NULL.
iucv_sock_bind() takes the classic path whenever the requested userid
matches iucv_userid, even on a guest that also has a HiperSockets device
carrying the same identifier. The child socket created by
afiucv_hs_callback_syn() for such a match inherits hs_dev = NULL and
transport = AF_IUCV_TRANS_HIPER, so the first send() on it returns -ENODEV.
The socket delivered to accept() is unusable.</p>
<p>Second, a frame arriving on one netdev can be delivered to a socket bound
to a different IQD device. Which can lead to
- Accept-queue exhaustion (DoS)
- Attacker-controlled peer identity in the child socket
- Data injection into existing sockets
- Fabric noise on the IQD fabric, where bogus replies are sent
- killing established connections</p>
<p>Third, all AF_IUCV sockets live in init_net, as iucv_sock_alloc() calls
sk_alloc(&amp;init_net, ...). But even frames arriving on netdev devices in a
namespace can be delivered to an IUCV socket. So a…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-81003"/>
  </entry>
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