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  <updated>2026-10-07T14:54:48.301869+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2023-0460</id>
    <title>CVE-2023-0460 — Remote code execution in YouTube Android Player API SDK</title>
    <updated>2026-10-07T14:54:48.316779+00:00</updated>
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      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Google YouTube Android Player API SDK</p>
<p>The YouTube Embedded 1.2 SDK binds to a service within the YouTube Main App. After binding, a remote context is created with the flags Context.CONTEXT_INCLUDE_CODE | Context.CONTEXT_IGNORE_SECURITY. This allows the client app to remotely load code from YouTube Main App by retrieving the Main App’s ClassLoader. A potential vulnerability in the binding logic used by the client SDK where the SDK ends up calling bindService() on a malicious app rather than YT Main App. This creates a vulnerability where the SDK can load the malicious app’s ClassLoader instead, allowing the malicious app to load arbitrary code into the calling app whenever the embedded SDK is invoked.</p>
<p>In order to trigger this vulnerability, an attacker must masquerade the Youtube app and install it on a device, have a second app that uses the Embedded player and typically distribute both to the victim outside of the Play Store.</p></div>
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    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2023-0460"/>
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