<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xml:lang="en">
  <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10</id>
  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-11-18T00:53:47.606372+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
  <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org" rel="alternate"/>
  <generator uri="https://lkiesow.github.io/python-feedgen" version="1.0.0">python-feedgen</generator>
  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2020-35861</id>
    <title>CVE-2020-35861</title>
    <updated>2026-11-18T00:53:47.607904+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>An issue was discovered in the bumpalo crate before 3.2.1 for Rust. The realloc feature allows the reading of unknown memory. Attackers can potentially read cryptographic keys.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2020-35861"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rustsec-2020-0006</id>
    <title>RUSTSEC-2020-0006 — Flaw in `realloc` allows reading unknown memory</title>
    <updated>2026-11-18T00:53:47.607948+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> crates.io: bumpalo</p>
<p>When `realloc`ing, if we allocate new space, we need to copy the old
allocation's bytes into the new space. There are `old_size` number of bytes in
the old allocation, but we were accidentally copying `new_size` number of bytes,
which could lead to copying bytes into the realloc'd space from past the chunk
that we're bump allocating out of, from unknown memory.</p>
<p>If an attacker can cause `realloc`s, and can read the `realoc`ed data back,
this could allow them to read things from other regions of memory that they
shouldn't be able to. For example, if some crypto keys happened to live in
memory right after a chunk we were bump allocating out of, this could allow
the attacker to read the crypto keys.</p>
<p>Beyond just fixing the bug and adding a regression test, I've also taken two
additional steps:</p>
<p>1. While we were already running the testsuite under `valgrind` in CI, because
   `valgrind` exits with the same code that the program did, if there are
   invalid reads/writes that happen not to trigger a segfault, the program can
   still exit OK and we will be none the wiser. I've enabled the
   `--error-exitcode=1` flag for `valgrind` in CI so that tests eagerly fail
   in these scenarios.</p>
<p>2. I've written a quickcheck test to exercise `realloc`. Without the bug fix
   in this patch, this quickcheck immediately triggers invalid reads when run
   under `valgrind`. We didn't previously have quickchecks that exercised
   `realloc` because `realloc` isn't publicly exposed directly, and i…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rustsec-2020-0006"/>
  </entry>
</feed>
