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  <updated>2026-11-17T18:18:56.634336+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-116794</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-116794 — russh: Agent server never calls `Agent::confirm`, so keys added with the confirm constraint (`ssh-add -c`) sign without…</title>
    <updated>2026-11-17T18:18:56.676047+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Eugeny russh</p>
<p>russh is a Rust SSH client and server library that includes an SSH agent protocol implementation. From 0.50.0-beta.12 until 0.65.0, the agent server's Connection::try_sign path in russh/src/keys/agent/server.rs recognizes SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM but returns a hard-coded successful result instead of calling Agent::confirm. In applications that override Agent::confirm to require user approval or another policy check, a process that can reach the agent socket, including the remote side of a forwarded agent, can use a key added through ssh-add -c without that check and can authenticate or sign data as the user while the key remains loaded. The separate Agent::confirm_request hook still runs for every signing request, so checks implemented there remain effective, and implementations that retain the default always-successful Agent::confirm do not lose an approval check through this regression. This issue is fixed in version 0.65.0.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-116794"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rustsec-2026-0495</id>
    <title>RUSTSEC-2026-0495 — Agent server signs with confirm-constrained keys without calling `Agent::confirm`</title>
    <updated>2026-11-17T18:18:56.676126+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> crates.io: russh</p>
<p>A key added to an SSH agent with the confirm constraint (what `ssh-add -c` sends) must not be used to sign until the user approves each use. russh's agent server (`russh::keys::agent::server`) accepted the constraint, but when a sign request arrived for such a key it used a fixed `true` in place of the result of `Agent::confirm`, so the application's confirmation step never ran. This started in 0.50.0-beta.12; 0.50.0-beta.8 to beta.11 still called `confirm`, and earlier russh releases have no agent server.</p>
<p>Any process that can reach the agent, including a remote host when the agent is forwarded, can then sign with the protected key without the user's approval, for example to log in elsewhere as the user. The private key itself is not disclosed. Agents whose `Agent::confirm` keeps the default, which always returns `true`, behave the same before and after the fix.</p>
<p>From 0.65.0 the agent server calls `Agent::confirm` for confirm-constrained keys and refuses to sign when it returns `false`. Implementations that left `confirm` unimplemented (for example as `todo!()`) will now reach that code.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rustsec-2026-0495"/>
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