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  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-11-18T03:05:29.867213+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-45402</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-45402 — Open WebUI: Cross-User File Access via Unchecked file_id in Folder Knowledge and Knowledge-Base Attach Endpoints</title>
    <updated>2026-11-18T03:05:29.869000+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> open-webui</p>
<p>Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.5, multiple endpoints accept a user-supplied file_id and attach the referenced file to a resource the caller controls (folder knowledge, knowledge-base contents) without verifying that the caller owns or has been granted access to the file. The file's content then becomes reachable through the downstream RAG / file-content paths, allowing any authenticated user to exfiltrate any other user's private file — and on the knowledge-base path, also to overwrite it — given knowledge of the file's UUID. This affects backend/open_webui/routers/folders.py (POST /api/v1/folders/{id}/update), backend/open_webui/routers/knowledge.py (add_file_to_knowledge_by_id), and backend/open_webui/routers/knowledge.py (add_files_to_knowledge_by_id_batch). This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.5.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-45402"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2752</id>
    <title>PYSEC-2026-2752 — Open WebUI: Cross-User File Access via Unchecked file_id in Folder Knowledge and Knowledge-Base Attach Endpoints</title>
    <updated>2026-11-18T03:05:29.869060+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: open-webui</p>
<p># Cross-User File Access via Unchecked file_id in Folder Knowledge and Knowledge-Base Attach Endpoints</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>Multiple endpoints accept a user-supplied `file_id` and attach the referenced file to a resource the caller controls (folder knowledge, knowledge-base contents) without verifying that the caller owns or has been granted access to the file. The file's content then becomes reachable through the downstream RAG / file-content paths, allowing any authenticated user to exfiltrate any other user's private file — and on the knowledge-base path, also to overwrite it — given knowledge of the file's UUID.</p>
<p>## Affected code paths</p>
<p>### Path 1 — Folder knowledge ingestion via `folders.update`</p>
<p>`backend/open_webui/routers/folders.py:156` — `POST /api/v1/folders/{id}/update` accepts a `FolderUpdateForm` whose `data: Optional[dict]` field is written verbatim into the folder. The folder consumer at `backend/open_webui/utils/middleware.py:2409` spreads `folder.data['files']` directly into `form_data['files']` for the next chat completion, which becomes RAG context. There is no per-file ownership check at the writer (the update handler) and no per-file ownership check at the reader (the middleware folder consumer) — only the *folder list* endpoint (`folders.py:78-94`) cleans up by stripping inaccessible files, and that runs lazily at folder-list time rather than at chat time. An attacker with a victim's file UUID can write `data: {"files": [{"id": "&lt;victim&gt;", "type": "file"}]}` in…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2752"/>
  </entry>
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