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BREW-glances-CVE-2026-68518 — Glances: Command injection bypass of action-template sanitizer via cross-field shell-operator reconstruction

2026-10-04T15:12:28.611026+00:00

Affected: Homebrew: glances

Glances is an open-source system cross-platform monitoring tool. Prior to 4.5.6, _sanitize_mustache_dict() in glances/actions.py sanitizes individual Mustache values before chevron.render(), allowing adjacent unescaped Mustache variables to reconstruct shell operators that secure_popen() executes when attacker-controlled process or container fields are rendered by an administrator-configured action template. This issue is fixed in 4.5.6.

CVE-2026-68518 — Glances: Command injection bypass of action-template sanitizer via cross-field shell-operator reconstruction

2026-10-04T15:12:28.611102+00:00

Affected: nicolargo glances

PYSEC-2026-3668 — Glances has a command injection bypass of action-template sanitizer via cross-field shell-operator reconstruction

2026-10-04T15:12:28.611169+00:00

Affected: PyPI: glances

### Summary

The Glances action system lets an administrator configure shell commands that run when a monitoring threshold is crossed. The command is a Mustache template whose variables are filled with runtime stat fields such as a process name, a container name or a filesystem mount point. Those fields are attacker-influenceable: a local, unprivileged user who starts a process (or a container) controls its name and command line. The rendered command is executed by `secure_popen()`, which interprets `&&`, `|` and `>` as chaining / pipe / redirection operators.

`glances/actions.py` defends against this with `_sanitize_mustache_dict()`, which strips those operators from **each individual** template value before rendering. The sanitization is applied per field, but the operators are reconstructed **across the boundary of two adjacent template variables** after Mustache rendering. When an action template concatenates two unescaped variables (`{{{a}}}{{{b}}}` or `{{&a}}{{&b}}`) and the attacker makes the first value end with `&` and the second begin with `&`, the rendered command contains a real `&&`, and `secure_popen()` executes the injected command. The single-`&` in each value passes the per-field filter untouched.

### Affected versions

`glances` `<= 4.5.5` (verified against the published PyPI release `4.5.5`, the latest at the time of writing; `glances.__version__ == "4.5.5"`). The per-field sanitizer `_sanitize_mustache_dict()` is present and active in this release. Not…