https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10 Most recent entries from all 2026-10-18T07:48:47.668196+00:00 Vulnerability-Lookup csirt@opendfir.org python-feedgen Contains only the most 10 recent entries. https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-32111 CVE-2026-32111 — ha-mcp OAuth 2.1 DCR mode enables network reconnaissance via an error oracle 2026-10-18T07:48:47.669820+00:00

Affected: homeassistant-ai ha-mcp

ha-mcp is a Home Assistant MCP Server. Prior to 7.0.0, the ha-mcp OAuth consent form (beta feature) accepts a user-supplied ha_url and makes a server-side HTTP request to {ha_url}/api/config with no URL validation. An unauthenticated attacker can submit arbitrary URLs to perform internal network reconnaissance via an error oracle. Two additional code paths in OAuth tool calls (REST and WebSocket) are affected by the same primitive. The primary deployment method (private URL with pre-configured HOMEASSISTANT_TOKEN) is not affected. This vulnerability is fixed in 7.0.0.

 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2507 PYSEC-2026-2507 — ha-mcp OAuth 2.1 DCR mode enables network reconnaissance via an error oracle 2026-10-18T07:48:47.669872+00:00

Affected: PyPI: ha-mcp

### Summary

The ha-mcp OAuth consent form (beta feature) accepts a user-supplied `ha_url` and makes a server-side HTTP request to `{ha_url}/api/config` with no URL validation. An unauthenticated attacker can submit arbitrary URLs to perform internal network reconnaissance via an error oracle. Two additional code paths in OAuth tool calls (REST and WebSocket) are affected by the same primitive.

The primary deployment method (private URL with pre-configured `HOMEASSISTANT_TOKEN`) is not affected.

### Details

**Code path 1 — Consent form validation** (reported)

When a user submits the OAuth consent form, `_validate_ha_credentials()` (`provider.py`) makes a server-side GET request to `{ha_url}/api/config` with no scheme, IP, or domain validation. Different exception types produce distinct error messages, creating an error oracle:

| Outcome | Message returned | Information leaked | |---------|------------------|--------------------| | `ConnectError` | "Could not connect..." | Host down or port closed | | `TimeoutException` | "Connection timed out..." | Host up, port filtered | | HTTP 401 | "Invalid access token..." | Service alive, requires auth | | HTTP 403 | "Access forbidden..." | Service alive, forbidden | | HTTP ≥ 400 | "Failed to connect: HTTP {N}" | Service alive, exact status |

An attacker can drive the flow programmatically: register a client via open DCR (`POST /register`), initiate authorization, extract a `txn_id`, and submit arbitrary `ha_url` values. No user…