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  <updated>2026-10-15T13:33:14.884623+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-35464</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-35464 — pyLoad has an incomplete fix for CVE-2026-33509: unprotected storage_folder enables arbitrary file write to Flask sessi…</title>
    <updated>2026-10-15T13:33:14.918267+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> pyload</p>
<p>pyLoad is a free and open-source download manager written in Python. The fix for CVE-2026-33509 added an ADMIN_ONLY_OPTIONS set to block non-admin users from modifying security-critical config options. The storage_folder option is not in this set and passes the existing path restriction because the Flask session directory is outside both PKGDIR and userdir. A user with SETTINGS and ADD permissions can redirect downloads to the Flask filesystem session store, plant a malicious pickle payload as a predictable session file, and trigger arbitrary code execution when any HTTP request arrives with the corresponding session cookie. This vulnerability is fixed with commit c4cf995a2803bdbe388addfc2b0f323277efc0e1.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-35464"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2989</id>
    <title>PYSEC-2026-2989 — pyLoad: Unprotected storage_folder enables arbitrary file write to Flask session store and code execution (Incomplete f…</title>
    <updated>2026-10-15T13:33:14.918329+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: pyload-ng</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>The fix for CVE-2026-33509 (GHSA-r7mc-x6x7-cqxx) added an `ADMIN_ONLY_OPTIONS` set to block non-admin users from modifying security-critical config options. The `storage_folder` option is not in this set and passes the existing path restriction because the Flask session directory is outside both PKGDIR and userdir. A user with SETTINGS and ADD permissions can redirect downloads to the Flask filesystem session store, plant a malicious pickle payload as a predictable session file, and trigger arbitrary code execution when any HTTP request arrives with the corresponding session cookie.</p>
<p>## Required Privileges</p>
<p>The chain requires a single non-admin user with both `SETTINGS` (to change `storage_folder`) and `ADD` (to submit a download URL) permissions. These are independent bitmask flags that can be assigned together by an admin. The final RCE trigger is unauthenticated: any HTTP request with the crafted session cookie causes deserialization.</p>
<p>## Root Cause</p>
<p>`storage_folder` at `src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py:238-246` has a path check that blocks writing inside PKGDIR or userdir using `os.path.realpath`. However, Flask's filesystem session directory (`/tmp/pyLoad/flask/` in the standard Docker deployment) is outside both restricted paths.</p>
<p>pyload configures Flask with `SESSION_TYPE = "filesystem"` at `__init__.py:127`. The cachelib `FileSystemCache` stores session files as `md5("session:" + session_id)` and deserializes them with `pickle.load()` on every request that…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2989"/>
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