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  <updated>2026-10-07T19:29:04.776606+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-34067</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-34067 — nimiq-transaction vulnerable to panic via `HistoryTreeProof` length mismatch</title>
    <updated>2026-10-07T19:29:04.792687+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> nimiq-transaction</p>
<p>nimiq-transaction provides the transaction primitive to be used in Nimiq's Rust implementation. Prior to version 1.3.0, `HistoryTreeProof::verify` panics on a malformed proof where `history.len() != positions.len()` due to `assert_eq!(history.len(), positions.len())`. The proof object is derived from untrusted p2p responses (`ResponseTransactionsProof.proof`) and is therefore attacker-controlled at the network boundary until validated. A malicious peer could trigger a crash by returning a crafted inclusion proof with a length mismatch. The patch for this vulnerability is included as part of v1.3.0. No known workarounds are available.</p></div>
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    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-34067"/>
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