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  <updated>2026-11-18T17:41:18.583458+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-71861</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-71861 — Chainguard SDK: AWS SigV4 token replay in auth/aws.VerifyToken — Chainguard-Audience/Chainguard-Identity binding header…</title>
    <updated>2026-11-18T17:41:18.584513+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> chainguard-dev sdk</p>
<p>The Chainguard SDK is a public Go SDK for integrating with the Chainguard platform. Prior to 0.1.107, auth/aws.VerifyToken trusts the Chainguard-Audience and Chainguard-Identity headers without requiring those headers to be covered by AWS SigV4 SignedHeaders. An attacker with a fresh STS GetCallerIdentity request signed by a victim can rewrite the unsigned binding headers and replay the proof to another relying party, causing the relying party to authenticate the victim’s AWS identity for an attacker-chosen audience and identity. Code that only uses auth/aws.GenerateToken is unaffected because the generator signs the binding headers, and exploitation requires a signed request within its validity window. This issue is fixed in version 0.1.107.</p></div>
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    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-71861"/>
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