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  <updated>2026-11-17T23:40:42.276294+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-19809</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-19809 — Kernel stack information disclosure in the charger_get_prop() system call handler</title>
    <updated>2026-11-17T23:40:42.293031+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> zephyrproject zephyr</p>
<p>The user-mode system call verifier z_vrfy_charger_get_prop() in drivers/charger/charger_handlers.c declares an uninitialized union charger_propval k_val on the kernel (privileged) stack, passes it to the charger driver back end via z_impl_charger_get_prop(), and then copies the full sizeof(union charger_propval) back into the calling user thread's buffer with k_usermode_to_copy(). That discloses kernel stack contents on two paths:</p>
<p>On error. The copy-out ignores the driver's return code. In-tree back ends return an error without writing through the value pointer for properties they do not implement: charger_gpio_get_prop() returns -ENOTSUP unconditionally, and bq24190_get_prop() has a default: return -ENOTSUP; arm that never touches val. The whole union is then stack residue.
On success. A back end writes only the one union member the requested property selects (for example sbs_charger.c writes the one-byte val-&gt;present for CHARGER_PROP_PRESENT and returns 0), yet the handler still copies the whole union, so every byte beyond that member is uninitialized.</p>
<p>The handler is compiled only when CONFIG_USERSPACE=y and is reachable by any user-mode thread that has been granted access to a charger device object. K_SYSCALL_DRIVER_CHARGER() validates only the device object and its API pointer, not the property identifier, so an unprivileged thread can choose prop freely: an unimplemented property forces the error path, a narrow one the success path, and the call can be repeated at wil…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-19809"/>
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