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  <updated>2026-11-21T11:29:05.191651+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-120699</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-120699 — CubeSandbox: Unrestricted host-directory bind-mount: any sandbox-create caller mounts arbitrary host paths (RW) into th…</title>
    <updated>2026-11-21T11:29:05.192857+00:00</updated>
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      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> TencentCloud CubeSandbox</p>
<p>CubeSandbox is an instant, concurrent, secure, and lightweight sandbox for AI agents. Prior to 0.5.1, any authenticated tenant permitted to call POST /sandboxes can supply metadata["host-mount"] with an arbitrary existing host path because the control plane performs no authorization check or allowed-prefix validation for the path. injectHostDirMounts forwards the path to prepareHostDirVolume, where Cubelet uses mount --rbind through the function to perform a recursive bind mount as root and exposes the host subtree to the tenant's MicroVM through virtio-fs, read-write by default. This allows host-root file access and modification, host code execution, access to the container runtime, and compromise of co-resident tenants without a kernel or virtual-machine-monitor flaw. This issue is fixed in version 0.5.1.</p></div>
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    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-120699"/>
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