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  <updated>2026-10-06T00:27:41.444383+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-68922</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-68922 — MobSF: Arbitrary File Read via Path Traversal in ZIP Uploads</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T00:27:41.468985+00:00</updated>
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      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> MobSF Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF</p>
<p>MobSF is a mobile application security testing tool used. Prior to 4.5.1, find_icon_path_zip in mobsf/StaticAnalyzer/views/android/icon_analysis.py uses the Android manifest android:icon value to construct paths under the scan resource directory without rejecting traversal or verifying containment, allowing an authenticated user to upload a crafted ZIP or APK that reads a server file with an ALLOWED_EXTENSIONS suffix, copies it to DWD_DIR as the predictable name -icon., and retrieves it through the /download/ endpoint. The same behavior provides a file-existence oracle through the icon_path report field. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.1.</p></div>
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    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-68922"/>
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