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  <updated>2026-10-05T05:31:29.564891+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-18438</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-18438 — Templately &lt;= 3.7.1 - Authenticated (Contributor+) Arbitrary File Upload to Remote Code Execution via Gutenberg Cloud I…</title>
    <updated>2026-10-05T05:31:29.579907+00:00</updated>
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      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> wpdevteam Templately – Elementor &amp; Gutenberg Template Library: 6500+ Free &amp; Pro Ready Templates And Cloud!</p>
<p>The Templately – Elementor &amp; Gutenberg Template Library: 6500+ Free &amp; Pro Ready Templates And Cloud! plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Remote Code Execution in all versions up to, and including, 3.7.1 via the fetch_remote_file function. This is due to a filename validation/destination mismatch in fetch_remote_file, where file type validation is performed against the attacker-controlled Content-Disposition filename rather than the URL-path-derived destination filename. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with contributor-level access and above, to execute code on the server. A GIF+PHP polyglot file passes wp_check_filetype_and_ext validation as image/gif via the Content-Disposition filename, while the actual destination path is written with a .php extension derived from the URL path, bypassing the unfiltered_upload capability gate entirely. The affected endpoints are reachable at this privilege level because Templately's entire REST API — including the cloud import endpoints used in this attack (/templately/v1/clouds/upload and /templately/v1/insert) — is authorized only by a current_user_can('delete_posts') check, with no administrator or manage_options capability requirement. The same permission gate also allows a contributor to overwrite the site's global Templately cloud connection via the /templately/v1/login endpoint with global_signin set to true. A complete remediation should both correct fetch_remote_file to validate the file type against the actu…</p></div>
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    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-18438"/>
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