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  <updated>2026-10-06T15:49:33.429655+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-59109</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-59109 — Zalktis: SQL injection via partner-controlled fields in imported e-invoices</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T15:49:33.448932+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Zalktis Programmas (SIA "Zalktis Programmas") Zalktis</p>
<p>SQL injection in the Zalktis accounting application via
trading-partner-controlled text fields in received electronic invoices. When
importing a received e-invoice (UBL/PEPPOL) or an e-commerce export, Zalktis
concatenates partner-controlled values directly into SQL statement text using
string concatenation, with neither parameterised queries nor escaping. The
application's own escaping helper, Dazadi.sql_txt(),
is not invoked on these code paths, so a party that sends an invoice can break
out of the string literal and alter the query logic.</p>
<p>This issue affects Zalktis: before 2026.1.586 and before 2026.2.592.</p></div>
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    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-59109"/>
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