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  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-10-07T06:13:13.056163+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-72761</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-72761 — Webhook SSRF guard bypassed by IPv6 transition addresses (NAT64/6to4/Teredo pass is_global check) in vulnerability-look…</title>
    <updated>2026-10-07T06:13:13.071906+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> vulnerability-lookup</p>
<p>The webhook URL validator in `website/notifications/webhooks.py` uses
`ip.is_global` to reject non-public addresses after DNS resolution. IPv6
transition addresses (NAT64 `64:ff9b::/96`, 6to4 `2002::/16`, Teredo
`2001:0000::/32`) are classified as globally routable by IANA, so `is_global`
returns `True` even when the embedded IPv4 targets a private, loopback, or
cloud metadata destination. An attacker can register a webhook pointing at a
hostname that resolves to a transition address to bypass the SSRF guard and
exfiltrate vulnerability data to an internal endpoint.</p>
<p>The vulnerability was introduced on a non-release version. The fix was already done on HEAD. It only affects</p>
<p>organisation running the HEAD.</p></div>
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    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-72761"/>
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