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  <updated>2026-10-07T13:02:59.762126+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-44964</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-44964</title>
    <updated>2026-10-07T13:02:59.779829+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Datadog Android App</p>
<p>In versions of the Datadog Android application prior to v545-5.9.2, OnCallNotificationActivity is declared exported with no permission guard. A co-installed application can launch it with attacker-controlled Intent extras, including a full-screen lock-screen message, an arbitrary on-call page ID, and an arbitrary Intent to run inside the Datadog process.
This requires:
A malicious application co-installed on the victim's device.
An active Datadog session in the Android app.
Impact: After a single tap on the Acknowledge button, the app sends a forged on-call acknowledgement to the backend under the victim's session, launches the attacker-supplied Intent from within the Datadog process (reaching otherwise non-exported components), and turns on the screen while dismissing the keyguard.</p></div>
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    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-44964"/>
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