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  <updated>2026-10-07T01:05:45.205652+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-54020</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-54020 — Open WebUI: DNS Rebinding SSRF Bypass</title>
    <updated>2026-10-07T01:05:45.221766+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> open-webui</p>
<p>Open WebUI is an extensible, feature-rich, and user-friendly self-hosted AI platform. Prior to 0.11.0, Open WebUI resolved a hostname during URL validation and rejected private, loopback, and link-local addresses, but the HTTP clients resolved the hostname again at connection time. An authenticated attacker who controlled authoritative DNS for a submitted hostname could answer with a public address during validation and an internal one during connection, reaching cloud metadata, loopback admin APIs, or internal services through URL ingest, chat image_url fetches, image editing, or OAuth profile-picture fetches, with most paths returning the response to the attacker and the OAuth path forwarding the OAuth access token. This issue is fixed in 0.11.0.</p></div>
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    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-54020"/>
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