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  <updated>2026-10-08T21:16:37.424216+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-67618</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-67618 — marimo &lt; 0.23.15 API Key Exfiltration via Malicious Notebook PEP-723 Metadata</title>
    <updated>2026-10-08T21:16:37.439279+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> marimo-team marimo</p>
<p>marimo before 0.23.15 contains a configuration injection vulnerability that allows notebook authors to exfiltrate operator API keys by embedding a malicious base_url in PEP-723 inline script metadata, which is merged into session configuration with higher precedence than the operator's own settings due to insufficient sanitization in sanitize_pyproject_dict. When an operator opens the crafted notebook and makes an AI request, marimo resolves the attacker-controlled base_url from the notebook config while falling back to the operator's OPENAI_API_KEY environment variable for authentication, transmitting the API key to the attacker-controlled endpoint without requiring any cell execution.</p></div>
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    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-67618"/>
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