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  <updated>2026-10-08T02:55:37.923771+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-65902</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-65902 — DOMPurify before 3.4.7 Hook Mutation Pollution via allowedTags</title>
    <updated>2026-10-08T02:55:37.940571+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> cure53 DOMPurify</p>
<p>DOMPurify before 3.4.7 (affected versions &lt;= 3.4.5) passes direct references to the module-level DEFAULT_ALLOWED_TAGS and DEFAULT_ALLOWED_ATTR sets to the uponSanitizeElement and uponSanitizeAttribute hooks via data.allowedTags / data.allowedAttributes when sanitize is called without an explicit cfg.ALLOWED_TAGS / cfg.ALLOWED_ATTR array. A hook that mutates these fields permanently widens the default allow-lists for the lifetime of the DOMPurify instance, so all subsequent default-config sanitize calls inherit the widened defaults and attacker payloads using the poisoned tag/attribute name survive sanitization. removeAllHooks(), clearConfig(), and passing a fresh cfg do not recover the state; only constructing a new DOMPurify instance does.</p></div>
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    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-65902"/>
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