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  <updated>2026-10-14T15:13:14.804619+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-48819</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-48819 — Hey API: `buildClientParams` template: prototype chain substitution via unknown `$&lt;slot&gt;___proto__` key</title>
    <updated>2026-10-14T15:13:14.819658+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> hey-api openapi-ts</p>
<p>Hey API is an ecosystem for turning API specifications into production-ready code. Prior to 0.97.3, dist/clients/core/params.ts ships a runtime template copied into generated SDKs as params.gen.ts, and buildClientParams writes unknown slot-prefixed keys such as $body_, $headers_, $path_, and $query_ directly to the corresponding slot, allowing $query___proto__ alongside a legitimate q field to set params.query through params["query"]["__proto__"] = value, call Object.setPrototypeOf(params.query, value), and expose inherited attacker-controlled keys during for..in iteration. This issue is fixed in version 0.97.3.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-48819"/>
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