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  <updated>2026-10-06T07:47:12.386883+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-52840</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-52840 — Easy!Appointments has server-side request forgery in CalDAV connection test that exposes the deployment's internal netw…</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T07:47:12.402272+00:00</updated>
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      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> alextselegidis easyappointments</p>
<p>Easy!Appointments is a self hosted appointment scheduler. In versions prior to 1.6.0, `Caldav::connect_to_server` at `application/controllers/Caldav.php:60` hands the request's `caldav_url` to a Guzzle `REPORT` call without scheme or host validation. A logged-in backend user (admin, provider, or secretary) reaches loopback, RFC1918, and link-local hosts on the deployment's network. The Guzzle exception path returns the upstream status code plus ~120 bytes of response body in the JSON `message` field (`Caldav.php:74-78`), so the SSRF is semi-blind. Version 1.6.0 contains a patch.</p></div>
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    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-52840"/>
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