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  <updated>2026-10-07T05:22:20.842811+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-52841</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-52841 — Easy!Appointments: Authorization bypass in Google OAuth provider binding lets any backend user rebind a peer provider's…</title>
    <updated>2026-10-07T05:22:20.844334+00:00</updated>
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      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> alextselegidis easyappointments</p>
<p>Easy!Appointments is a self hosted appointment scheduler. In versions prior to 1.6.0, `Google::oauth` at `application/controllers/Google.php:278` stores its URL-supplied `provider_id` in the session, and `oauth_callback` saves the issued Google OAuth token against that row without checking the caller owns the provider. Any logged-in backend user (admin, provider, or secretary) rebinds a peer provider's Google sync to a Google account they control. The peer's appointments then sync into the attacker's calendar with each customer's name and email attached as attendee data. Version 1.6.0 patches the issue.</p></div>
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    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-52841"/>
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