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  <updated>2026-10-08T16:59:40.983302+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-31978</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-31978 — motionEye: Arbitrary File Read via Path Traversal in Picture/Movie Preview Endpoint</title>
    <updated>2026-10-08T16:59:40.998413+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> motioneye-project motioneye</p>
<p>motionEye (mEye) is an online interface for motion software, which is a video surveillance program with motion detection. Versions prior to 0.44.0 are vulnerable to path traversal in the picture and movie API endpoints, suhc as /picture/{id}/preview/{filename}. Neither the API handlers, nor the mediafiles.py functions such as get_media_preview() check for .. sequences in the filename parameter, except for get_media_content(). This allows an authenticated user with normal (non-admin) privileges to read arbitrary files from the filesystem as the motionEye process user, such as:  /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, motionEye config files containing password hashes and plaintext passwords, SSH keys, and other cameras' surveillance footage. This issue has been fixed in version 0.44.0.</p></div>
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    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-31978"/>
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