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  <updated>2026-10-19T01:37:30.080493+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-12726</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-12726 — Awx: automation-controller: awx: github webhook second-order ssrf via unvalidated statuses_url exfiltrates pat credenti…</title>
    <updated>2026-10-19T01:37:30.081562+00:00</updated>
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      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2</p>
<p>A flaw was found in the AWX GitHub webhook integration. When processing GitHub pull_request webhooks, the controller stores the pull_request.statuses_url value from the webhook payload without validating that it points to a trusted GitHub API endpoint. If a job template is configured with a GitHub Personal Access Token as its webhook credential, the controller later POSTs that token to the stored callback URL when posting job status updates. An attacker who can submit a correctly signed forged webhook using the job template's webhook_key can redirect the callback to an attacker-controlled URL and exfiltrate the configured GitHub PAT.</p></div>
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    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-12726"/>
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