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  <updated>2026-10-07T23:40:47.728292+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-47172</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-47172 — Quest Bot: Untrusted pull request code can be built and deployed by privileged `workflow_run` deployment.</title>
    <updated>2026-10-07T23:40:47.742514+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> duck-organization quest-bot</p>
<p>Quest Bot is an opensource modern Discord Bot built for moderation, utilities and support. Prior to version 1.0.3, the repository has a privileged deploy workflow that runs after the unprivileged build workflow completes. The build workflow runs on pull requests, and the deploy workflow checks out the triggering workflow’s head_sha, builds that code into a Docker image, pushes it as latest, and triggers production deployment. If an attacker can open a pull request from a branch named main, the deploy workflow condition can treat the PR build as deployable and build the attacker-controlled commit in a privileged deployment context. This can result in malicious container deployment and production bot compromise. This issue has been patched in version 1.0.3.</p></div>
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    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-47172"/>
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