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  <updated>2026-10-09T17:02:12.300146+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-44213</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-44213 — OpenTelemetry.Exporter.Instana bypasses TLS certificate validation when a proxy is configured</title>
    <updated>2026-10-09T17:02:12.315170+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> open-telemetry opentelemetry-dotnet-contrib</p>
<p>The OpenTelemetry.Exporter.Instana exports telemetry to Instana backend. Prior to 1.1.0, the OpenTelemetry.Exporter.Instana NuGet package does not validate HTTPS/TLS certificates are valid when sending telemetry to a configured Instana back-end when a proxy is configured using the INSTANA_ENDPOINT_PROXY environment variable. If a network attacker can Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) the proxy connection, all OpenTelemetry telemetry data and the Instana API key are exposed to the attacker. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.1.0.</p></div>
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    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-44213"/>
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