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  <updated>2026-10-07T17:36:41.954204+00:00</updated>
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    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2021-47277</id>
    <title>CVE-2021-47277 — kvm: avoid speculation-based attacks from out-of-range memslot accesses</title>
    <updated>2026-10-07T17:36:41.955508+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Linux</p>
<p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p>
<p>kvm: avoid speculation-based attacks from out-of-range memslot accesses</p>
<p>KVM's mechanism for accessing guest memory translates a guest physical
address (gpa) to a host virtual address using the right-shifted gpa
(also known as gfn) and a struct kvm_memory_slot.  The translation is
performed in __gfn_to_hva_memslot using the following formula:</p>
<p>hva = slot-&gt;userspace_addr + (gfn - slot-&gt;base_gfn) * PAGE_SIZE</p>
<p>It is expected that gfn falls within the boundaries of the guest's
physical memory.  However, a guest can access invalid physical addresses
in such a way that the gfn is invalid.</p>
<p>__gfn_to_hva_memslot is called from kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_hva_prot, which first
retrieves a memslot through __gfn_to_memslot.  While __gfn_to_memslot
does check that the gfn falls within the boundaries of the guest's
physical memory or not, a CPU can speculate the result of the check and
continue execution speculatively using an illegal gfn. The speculation
can result in calculating an out-of-bounds hva.  If the resulting host
virtual address is used to load another guest physical address, this
is effectively a Spectre gadget consisting of two consecutive reads,
the second of which is data dependent on the first.</p>
<p>Right now it's not clear if there are any cases in which this is
exploitable.  One interesting case was reported by the original author
of this patch, and involves visiting guest page tables on x86.  Right
now these a…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2021-47277"/>
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