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  <updated>2026-10-07T11:18:40.457264+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-40880</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-40880 — Zebra: Cached Mempool Verification Bypasses Consensus Rules for Ahead-of-Tip Blocks</title>
    <updated>2026-10-07T11:18:40.478888+00:00</updated>
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      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> ZcashFoundation zebrad, ZcashFoundation zebra-consensus</p>
<p>ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to zebrad version 4.3.1 and zebra-consensus version 5.0.2, a logic error in Zebra's transaction verification cache could allow a malicious miner to induce a consensus split. By carefully submitting a transaction that is valid for height H+1 but invalid for H+2 and then mining that transaction in a block at height H+2, a miner could cause vulnerable Zebra nodes to accept an invalid block, leading to a consensus split from the rest of the Zcash network. This vulnerability is fixed in zebrad version 4.3.1 and zebra-consensus version 5.0.2.</p></div>
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    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-40880"/>
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