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  <updated>2026-10-09T00:39:54.855922+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-40070</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-40070 — bsv-sdk and bsv-wallet persist unverified certifier signatures in acquire_certificate (direct and issuance paths)</title>
    <updated>2026-10-09T00:39:54.874807+00:00</updated>
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      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> sgbett bsv-ruby-sdk, sgbett bsv-sdk, sgbett bsv-wallet</p>
<p>BSV Ruby SDK is the Ruby SDK for the BSV blockchain. From 0.3.1 to before 0.8.2, BSV::Wallet::WalletClient#acquire_certificate persists certificate records to storage without verifying the certifier's signature over the certificate contents. In acquisition_protocol: 'direct', the caller supplies all certificate fields (including signature:) and the record is written to storage verbatim. In acquisition_protocol: 'issuance', the client POSTs to a certifier URL and writes whatever signature the response body contains, also without verification. An attacker who can reach either API (or who controls a certifier endpoint targeted by the issuance path) can forge identity certificates that subsequently appear authentic to list_certificates and prove_certificate.</p></div>
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    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-40070"/>
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