<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xml:lang="en">
  <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10</id>
  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-10-05T16:17:54.369669+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
  <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org" rel="alternate"/>
  <generator uri="https://lkiesow.github.io/python-feedgen" version="1.0.0">python-feedgen</generator>
  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-27976</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-27976 — Zed Extension Sandbox Escape via Tar Symlink Following</title>
    <updated>2026-10-05T16:17:54.390756+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> zed-industries zed</p>
<p>Zed, a code editor, has an extension installer allows tar/gzip downloads. Prior to version 0.224.4, the tar extractor (`async_tar::Archive::unpack`) creates symlinks from the archive without validation, and the path guard (`writeable_path_from_extension`) only performs lexical prefix checks without resolving symlinks. An attacker can ship a tar that first creates a symlink inside the extension workdir pointing outside (e.g., `escape -&gt; /`), then writes files through the symlink, causing writes to arbitrary host paths. This escapes the extension sandbox and enables code execution. Version 0.224.4 patches the issue.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-27976"/>
  </entry>
</feed>
