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  <updated>2026-10-15T19:11:18.803130+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2025-53104</id>
    <title>CVE-2025-53104 — gluestack-ui Command Injection Vulnerability via discussion-to-slack GitHub Action Workflow</title>
    <updated>2026-10-15T19:11:18.804224+00:00</updated>
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      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> gluestack-ui</p>
<p>gluestack-ui is a library of copy-pasteable components &amp; patterns crafted with Tailwind CSS (NativeWind). Prior to commit e6b4271, a command injection vulnerability was discovered in the discussion-to-slack.yml GitHub Actions workflow. Untrusted discussion fields (title, body, etc.) were directly interpolated into shell commands in a run: block. An attacker could craft a malicious GitHub Discussion title or body (e.g., $(curl ...)) to execute arbitrary shell commands on the Actions runner. This issue has been fixed in commit e6b4271 where the discussion-to-slack.yml workflow was removed. Users should remove the discussion-to-slack.yml workflow if using a fork or derivative of this repository.</p></div>
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    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2025-53104"/>
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