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  <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10</id>
  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-11-17T10:33:15.043760+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
  <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org" rel="alternate"/>
  <generator uri="https://lkiesow.github.io/python-feedgen" version="1.0.0">python-feedgen</generator>
  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-99018</id>
    <title>BELL-CVE-2026-99018</title>
    <updated>2026-11-17T10:33:15.053859+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-99018"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1537</id>
    <title>certfr-2026-avi-1537 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux d'Ubuntu. Certaines d'entre elles permettent à un a…</title>
    <updated>2026-11-17T10:33:15.053911+00:00</updated>
    <content>certfr-2026-avi-1537</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1537"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-392034</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-392034</title>
    <updated>2026-11-17T10:33:15.053931+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-392034</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-392034"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-99018</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-99018</title>
    <updated>2026-11-17T10:33:15.053944+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p>
<p>riscv: entry: gate shadow call stack reload on sstatus.SPP, not tp</p>
<p>Under CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK, handle_exception() reloads the kernel
shadow call stack pointer (gp) only when the trap came from userspace.
It made that decision with scs_load_current_if_task_changed, which
compares the trap-time tp (read back from sscratch into s5) against the
current tp:</p>
<p>beq	\prev, tp, _skip_scs
	scs_load_current
_skip_scs:</p>
<p>tp is a user-writable register.  A user task that sets tp to the
linear-map address of its own task_struct (&amp;current) before trapping
makes the comparison succeed (can achieve by brute force with KASLR
enable under our test), so the kernel skips scs_load_current and
keeps running with the gp that userspace left in place.  Under
CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK gp is the shadow call stack pointer and
load_global_pointer is a no-op, so the compiler-emitted
"sd ra, -8(gp)" / "ld ra, -8(gp)" in every non-leaf function then write
to, and return through, an attacker-controlled address -- an
unprivileged kernel arbitrary-write and control-flow-hijack primitive.
The poisoned gp is saved to task_struct.scs_sp on return, so the reload
is skipped on every subsequent entry as well.</p>
<p>Decide "came from userspace" from the hardware sstatus.SPP bit (already
in s1 at this point) instead of from tp, mirroring the check that
ret_from_exception already uses a few instructions later.  SPP is
written by hardware on trap entry a…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-99018"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-7x79-hrpm-vw9w</id>
    <title>GHSA-7x79-hrpm-vw9w</title>
    <updated>2026-11-17T10:33:15.053988+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p>
<p>riscv: entry: gate shadow call stack reload on sstatus.SPP, not tp</p>
<p>Under CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK, handle_exception() reloads the kernel
shadow call stack pointer (gp) only when the trap came from userspace.
It made that decision with scs_load_current_if_task_changed, which
compares the trap-time tp (read back from sscratch into s5) against the
current tp:</p>
<p>beq	\prev, tp, _skip_scs
	scs_load_current
_skip_scs:</p>
<p>tp is a user-writable register.  A user task that sets tp to the
linear-map address of its own task_struct (&amp;current) before trapping
makes the comparison succeed (can achieve by brute force with KASLR
enable under our test), so the kernel skips scs_load_current and
keeps running with the gp that userspace left in place.  Under
CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK gp is the shadow call stack pointer and
load_global_pointer is a no-op, so the compiler-emitted
"sd ra, -8(gp)" / "ld ra, -8(gp)" in every non-leaf function then write
to, and return through, an attacker-controlled address -- an
unprivileged kernel arbitrary-write and control-flow-hijack primitive.
The poisoned gp is saved to task_struct.scs_sp on return, so the reload
is skipped on every subsequent entry as well.</p>
<p>Decide "came from userspace" from the hardware sstatus.SPP bit (already
in s1 at this point) instead of from tp, mirroring the check that
ret_from_exception already uses a few instructions later.  SPP is
written by hardware on trap entry a…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-7x79-hrpm-vw9w"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-99018</id>
    <title>msrc_CVE-2026-99018 — riscv: entry: gate shadow call stack reload on sstatus.SPP, not tp</title>
    <updated>2026-11-17T10:33:15.054021+00:00</updated>
    <content>msrc_CVE-2026-99018</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-99018"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-99018</id>
    <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-99018</title>
    <updated>2026-11-17T10:33:15.054037+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 164 more</p>
<p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: riscv: entry: gate shadow call stack reload on sstatus.SPP, not tp Under CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK, handle_exception() reloads the kernel shadow call stack pointer (gp) only when the trap came from userspace. It made that decision with scs_load_current_if_task_changed, which compares the trap-time tp (read back from sscratch into s5) against the current tp: 	beq	\prev, tp, _skip_scs 	scs_load_current _skip_scs: tp is a user-writable register.  A user task that sets tp to the linear-map address of its own task_struct (&amp;current) before trapping makes the comparison succeed (can achieve by brute force with KASLR enable under our test), so the kernel skips scs_load_current and keeps running with the gp that userspace left in place.  Under CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK gp is the shadow call stack pointer and load_global_pointer is a no-op, so the compiler-emitted "sd ra, -8(gp)" / "ld ra, -8(gp)" in every non-leaf function then write to, and return through, an attacker-controlled address -- an unprivileged kernel arbitrary-write and control-flow-hijack primitive. The poisoned gp is saved to task_struct.scs_sp on return, so the reload is skipped on every subsequent entry as well. Decide "came from userspace" from the hardware sstatus.SPP bit (already in s1 at this point) instead of from tp, mirroring the check that ret_from_exception already uses a few instructions later.  SPP is written by hardware on trap entry and ca…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-99018"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-4152</id>
    <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-4152 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
    <updated>2026-11-17T10:33:15.054363+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise einen Denial-of-Service-Angriff auszulösen, Daten zu manipulieren oder offenzulegen oder Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-4152"/>
  </entry>
</feed>
