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  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-10-10T15:35:11.339704+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-325366</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-325366</title>
    <updated>2026-10-10T15:35:11.341684+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-325366</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-325366"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-8839</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-8839</title>
    <updated>2026-10-10T15:35:11.341718+00:00</updated>
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        <p>The MapPress Maps for WordPress plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key in all versions up to, and including, 2.96.6. This is due to missing ownership verification in the REST API routes registered via `Mappress_Api::rest_api_init()`, where the GET `/wp-json/mapp/v1/maps/{mapid}` endpoint uses `'permission_callback' =&gt; '__return_true'` and the write endpoints (POST update, DELETE, PATCH mutate, POST clone, POST empty_trash) only check the generic `edit_posts` capability without confirming that the requester owns the targeted map — a gap that is not compensated at the model layer, as `Mappress_Map::get()`, `save()`, `delete()`, `mutate()`, and `empty_trash()` all operate on any caller-supplied map ID without an ownership check. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to read sensitive map data — including POI titles, addresses, coordinates, and body content — for any map on the site by enumerating map IDs, and for authenticated attackers with Contributor-level access and above to modify, delete, trash/restore, or clone any map regardless of its author.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-8839"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-4m8c-59q5-hc8f</id>
    <title>GHSA-4m8c-59q5-hc8f</title>
    <updated>2026-10-10T15:35:11.341768+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>The MapPress Maps for WordPress plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key in all versions up to, and including, 2.96.6. This is due to missing ownership verification in the REST API routes registered via `Mappress_Api::rest_api_init()`, where the GET `/wp-json/mapp/v1/maps/{mapid}` endpoint uses `'permission_callback' =&gt; '__return_true'` and the write endpoints (POST update, DELETE, PATCH mutate, POST clone, POST empty_trash) only check the generic `edit_posts` capability without confirming that the requester owns the targeted map — a gap that is not compensated at the model layer, as `Mappress_Map::get()`, `save()`, `delete()`, `mutate()`, and `empty_trash()` all operate on any caller-supplied map ID without an ownership check. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to read sensitive map data — including POI titles, addresses, coordinates, and body content — for any map on the site by enumerating map IDs, and for authenticated attackers with Contributor-level access and above to modify, delete, trash/restore, or clone any map regardless of its author.</p>
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    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-4m8c-59q5-hc8f"/>
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