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  <updated>2026-10-10T12:35:16.841268+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-363298</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-363298</title>
    <updated>2026-10-10T12:35:16.887430+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-363298</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-363298"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-82404</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-82404</title>
    <updated>2026-10-10T12:35:16.887466+00:00</updated>
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        <p>TOON is a compact, human-readable serialization of JSON data for LLM prompts. Prior to 2.3.1, decoding attacker-controlled TOON with a __proto__, constructor, or prototype key wrote through the object prototype chain instead of creating an own property, polluting Object.prototype for the runtime. In packages/toon/src/decode/expand.ts, the expandPaths: 'safe' path and insertPathSafe function made dotted keys such as a.__proto__.x the strongest vector, while plain nested objects, tabular rows, quoted keys, and streaming decode were also affected. The encoder also dropped own __proto__ properties and could invoke an inherited setter during normalization. Services that decode untrusted TOON could experience denial of service or, when a suitable downstream gadget is present, remote code execution. This issue is fixed in version 2.3.1.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-82404"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-p95v-992w-h6c3</id>
    <title>GHSA-p95v-992w-h6c3 — TOON: Prototype pollution when decoding untrusted TOON input</title>
    <updated>2026-10-10T12:35:16.887505+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: @toon-format/toon</p>
<p>### Summary</p>
<p>Decoding attacker-controlled TOON containing a `__proto__`, `constructor`, or `prototype` key wrote through the object's prototype chain instead of creating an own property, polluting `Object.prototype` for the whole runtime. The `expandPaths: 'safe'` path (dotted keys such as `a.__proto__.x`) was the strongest vector; plain nested objects, tabular rows, and quoted keys were all affected. The encoder had a matching defect: it silently dropped own `__proto__` properties and could fire an inherited setter while normalizing.</p>
<p>### Impact</p>
<p>Any service that decodes untrusted TOON is affected. Prototype pollution can escalate to denial of service or, with a suitable downstream gadget, remote code execution.</p>
<p>### Patches</p>
<p>Upgrade to `@toon-format/toon@2.3.1`. Decoders now materialize `__proto__`/`constructor`/`prototype` as ordinary own data properties, matching `JSON.parse` semantics; the encoder preserves the same keys without invoking inherited accessors.</p>
<p>### Workarounds</p>
<p>None. Upgrade is the only fix. Callers who cannot upgrade should reject input whose keys include `__proto__`, `constructor`, or `prototype` before decoding.</p>
<p>### Port maintainers</p>
<p>The same bug shape can exist in any implementation that assigns decoded keys with `obj[key] = value`. Rust, Swift, Java, Python, and C# ports should audit their object-construction and path-expansion paths for the three prototype keys.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-p95v-992w-h6c3"/>
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