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  <updated>2026-10-08T17:24:17.499301+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-363591</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-363591</title>
    <updated>2026-10-08T17:24:17.501425+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-363591</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-363591"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-81892</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-81892</title>
    <updated>2026-10-08T17:24:17.501456+00:00</updated>
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        <p>EasyAdmin is a fast and modern admin generator for Symfony applications. From 4.0.0 until 4.29.16 and 5.5.1, EasyAdmin serves all backend requests through a single dashboard route and, for custom actions (Action::linkToRoute() and MenuItem::linkToRoute()), swaps the executed controller based on the routeName query parameter on the kernel.controller event. The swap happens after Symfony's security firewall has already evaluated access_control against the original dashboard URL, and the routeName value was not validated. As a result, a path-based access_control rule protecting the target route was never evaluated, so a low-privilege backend user who can reach a single EasyAdmin URL and knows a target route's name can execute that route's controller, bypassing the path-based rule. Only path-based protections are bypassed. Routes whose controller enforces its own authorization with #[IsGranted] or denyAccessUnlessGranted() remain protected because those checks are recomputed against the swapped-in controller. This issue is fixed in versions 4.29.16 and 5.5.1.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-81892"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-g2fm-8hr4-j82h</id>
    <title>GHSA-g2fm-8hr4-j82h — EasyAdmin custom-action dispatcher bypasses access_control on other routes</title>
    <updated>2026-10-08T17:24:17.501493+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Packagist: easycorp/easyadmin-bundle</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>EasyAdmin serves all backend requests through a single dashboard route and, for custom actions (`Action::linkToRoute()` / `MenuItem::linkToRoute()`), swaps the executed controller based on the `routeName` query parameter on the `kernel.controller` event.</p>
<p>That swap happens **after** Symfony's security firewall has already evaluated `access_control` against the original dashboard URL, and the `routeName` value was not validated. As a result, a path-based `access_control` rule protecting the *target* route was never evaluated, so a low-privilege backend user could reach a more restricted route by name.</p>
<p>## Impact</p>
<p>Any application where `access_control` (or another path-based Symfony security rule) protects some routes more strictly than the dashboard URL used to reach EasyAdmin. An attacker who can reach a single EasyAdmin URL and knows a target route's **name** can execute that route's controller, bypassing the path-based rule.</p>
<p>Only **path-based** protections are bypassed. Routes whose controller enforces its own authorization with `#[IsGranted]` / `denyAccessUnlessGranted()` remain protected, because those checks are recomputed against the swapped-in controller.</p>
<p>## Patches</p>
<p>Fixed in **4.29.16** and **5.5.1**. Before dispatching a custom-action route, EasyAdmin now re-evaluates the target route's `access_control` rule and denies the request if the current user is not granted access.</p>
<p>## Workarounds</p>
<p>Add controller-level authorization (`#[IsGranted]` / `denyAcces…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-g2fm-8hr4-j82h"/>
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