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  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-10-09T18:27:29.999304+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-359061</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-359061</title>
    <updated>2026-10-09T18:27:30.053704+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-359061</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-359061"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-80347</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-80347</title>
    <updated>2026-10-09T18:27:30.053743+00:00</updated>
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        <p>mcp-fetch checks a fetch target against its SSRF guard without removing the brackets that surround an IPv6 literal. isSafeUrl reads the hostname from the parsed URL, which for a literal such as http://[::1]/ yields the bracketed string, and then tests it with net.isIP. That call returns zero for a bracketed value, so the branch holding the private-address checks is skipped entirely. The guard falls back to resolving the hostname, the bracketed string is not a resolvable name, no addresses are returned, and the target is reported safe. The HTTP client then strips the brackets and connects. Because the address may be given in IPv4-mapped form, the same path reaches any IPv4 target the loopback and private checks were meant to exclude, including link-local metadata endpoints. isPrivateIPv6 also has no case for the ::ffff: prefix, so the mapped form would still pass even if the brackets were removed. The fetch target is supplied as a tool argument, so an attacker who can influence what the model requests can read internal responses back into the model context.</p>
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    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-80347"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-mqq2-4r9w-4h99</id>
    <title>GHSA-mqq2-4r9w-4h99</title>
    <updated>2026-10-09T18:27:30.053784+00:00</updated>
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        <p>mcp-fetch checks a fetch target against its SSRF guard without removing the brackets that surround an IPv6 literal. isSafeUrl reads the hostname from the parsed URL, which for a literal such as http://[::1]/ yields the bracketed string, and then tests it with net.isIP. That call returns zero for a bracketed value, so the branch holding the private-address checks is skipped entirely. The guard falls back to resolving the hostname, the bracketed string is not a resolvable name, no addresses are returned, and the target is reported safe. The HTTP client then strips the brackets and connects. Because the address may be given in IPv4-mapped form, the same path reaches any IPv4 target the loopback and private checks were meant to exclude, including link-local metadata endpoints. isPrivateIPv6 also has no case for the ::ffff: prefix, so the mapped form would still pass even if the brackets were removed. The fetch target is supplied as a tool argument, so an attacker who can influence what the model requests can read internal responses back into the model context.</p>
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    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-mqq2-4r9w-4h99"/>
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