Affected: Homebrew: aider

- **CWE:** CWE-73 (External Control of File Name or Path) / CWE-22 (Path Traversal, in the "escapes intended base directory" sense) - **Affected component:** `git/repo/base.py`, `Repo.unsafe_git_clone_options` (class attribute, lines 153-165) and `Repo._clone()` (lines 1477-1520), reached via the public `Repo.clone_from()` (line 1626) and `Repo.clone()` (line 1567) APIs. - **Affected version:** GitPython at HEAD (`9729ed3b948f2bde09f1f188c5311e172212b67e`, 2026-08-05, VERSION `3.1.58`)

## Reachability `Repo.clone_from(url, to_path, **kwargs)` (and `Repo.clone()`) forward arbitrary keyword arguments to the underlying `git clone` invocation. Before forwarding, GitPython builds a candidate option list from the kwargs (`Git._option_candidates`) and checks it against a denylist, `Repo.unsafe_git_clone_options`, via `Git.check_unsafe_options()` — *unless* the caller passes `allow_unsafe_options=True`. This denylist mechanism is exactly the guard that the last ~16 published GHSAs against this repo (2026-07-12 → 2026-08-05) have repeatedly found incomplete or bypassable for other options (`--template`, `--upload-pack`, `--config`, `--exec`, `--output`, `--index-output`, `--pathspec-from-file`, etc.).

`git clone` also accepts `--separate-git-dir=<path>`, which redirects the repository's entire `.git` metadata directory to an **arbitrary, caller-controlled filesystem path**, leaving only a gitlink text file (`gitdir: <path>`) at the intended destination. This is the exact same primi…

GitPython before 3.1.59 omits --separate-git-dir from unsafe_git_clone_options, allowing attackers to create arbitrary git directories outside the intended clone destination. Attackers can pass a separate_git_dir parameter to Repo.clone_from() or Repo.clone() to redirect repository metadata to an attacker-controlled filesystem path, enabling arbitrary directory creation and potential hook execution.

Affected: PyPI: GitPython

- **CWE:** CWE-73 (External Control of File Name or Path) / CWE-22 (Path Traversal, in the "escapes intended base directory" sense) - **Affected component:** `git/repo/base.py`, `Repo.unsafe_git_clone_options` (class attribute, lines 153-165) and `Repo._clone()` (lines 1477-1520), reached via the public `Repo.clone_from()` (line 1626) and `Repo.clone()` (line 1567) APIs. - **Affected version:** GitPython at HEAD (`9729ed3b948f2bde09f1f188c5311e172212b67e`, 2026-08-05, VERSION `3.1.58`)

## Reachability `Repo.clone_from(url, to_path, **kwargs)` (and `Repo.clone()`) forward arbitrary keyword arguments to the underlying `git clone` invocation. Before forwarding, GitPython builds a candidate option list from the kwargs (`Git._option_candidates`) and checks it against a denylist, `Repo.unsafe_git_clone_options`, via `Git.check_unsafe_options()` — *unless* the caller passes `allow_unsafe_options=True`. This denylist mechanism is exactly the guard that the last ~16 published GHSAs against this repo (2026-07-12 → 2026-08-05) have repeatedly found incomplete or bypassable for other options (`--template`, `--upload-pack`, `--config`, `--exec`, `--output`, `--index-output`, `--pathspec-from-file`, etc.).

`git clone` also accepts `--separate-git-dir=<path>`, which redirects the repository's entire `.git` metadata directory to an **arbitrary, caller-controlled filesystem path**, leaving only a gitlink text file (`gitdir: <path>`) at the intended destination. This is the exact same primi…

Affected: openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP1: python-GitPython

GitPython is a python library used to interact with git repositories, high-level like git-porcelain, or low-level like git-plumbing. Security Fix(es):

GitPython before 3.1.57 contains an incomplete denylist in the unsafe_git_archive_options guard that omits --add-file and --add-virtual-file options. Attackers can supply these options to Repo.archive() to read arbitrary files from the filesystem and include them in the returned archive.(CVE-2026-73619)

GitPython before 3.1.57 fails to guard git option forwarding in IndexFile.checkout() and TagReference.create(), allowing attackers to pass unsafe options via kwargs. Attackers can use --prefix to overwrite arbitrary files with repository content or -F to read arbitrary files returned in-band.(CVE-2026-73620)

GitPython before 3.1.56 contains an argument injection vulnerability in the Commit.count() method, which forwards keyword arguments to &apos;git rev-list&apos; without the check_unsafe_options guard present in the sibling iter_items method. An attacker who can control options passed to Commit.count (e.g., via an application that forwards a user-supplied options dict) can supply output=&lt;path&gt;, causing &apos;git rev-list --output=&lt;path&gt;&apos; to open and truncate the target file to zero bytes before revision parsing. This allows destruction/blanking of an arbitrary file at the process&apos;s privilege level (no content control, 0-byte truncation).(CVE-2026-73621)

GitPython before 3.1.55 fails to disable env…

Security update for python-GitPython

Affected: PyPI: gitpython

GitPython before 3.1.59 omits --separate-git-dir from unsafe_git_clone_options, allowing attackers to create arbitrary git directories outside the intended clone destination. Attackers can pass a separate_git_dir parameter to Repo.clone_from() or Repo.clone() to redirect repository metadata to an attacker-controlled filesystem path, enabling arbitrary directory creation and potential hook execution.